"Dear gentlemen, the first thing we are going to is Riga, where we will receive a batch of heavy artillery shipped from the United States and complete the lifting and transportation of the port. At the same time, we will also conduct simulation training in the area near the Baltic Sea. There are not only plains on the battlefield in the Far East, but also hills, swamps and other terrains. Then we will try to have long-range maneuvering of heavy artillery without railways." On the way to Warsaw, a Russian officer said to a technician from Bavaria on a train.

The prince was still very cooperative this time. In just one week, a 15-person technical team composed of Bavarian military technicians and automobile factory technicians was arranged, and three cars were also allocated to be used as experimental items. Grove was one of them. His public identity as a technician at the Munich Automobile Factory, but in fact he was a staff officer of the First Bavarian Army, who was mainly responsible for logistics evaluation. His main purpose of coming to Russia was to evaluate the potential of German railway logistics!

"The speed of the Russian trains moving day and night can be described as tragedy. Even if we are riding a military train and are not disturbed by any civilian train, the distance we travels every day and night is not more than 300 kilometers! There is no automatic gate on their train, which makes every brake and start of the train a troublesome thing." Grove wrote down the first one in his mind.

"The Russian railway system is generally backward, and its divisions are very short and uneven. Most railway lines are divided into central parts of the core city. The biggest problem with Russian railways is the lack of railways running through the north and south. If Ukrainian food wants to be transported to areas such as St. Petersburg and Riga, these trucks must first go to Moscow and then turn northwest."

"The Russian railways are mainly concentrated in St. Petersburg, Riga, Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania-Belarus, Moscow and Finland. The railway density in these places is 5 times or even 10 times that of other regions, but even so, the railway situation of the Russians in these regions is still not comparable to that of Western European countries. According to my estimate, the density of railways in the European region of Russia is only one-tenth of that of us. Even if we throw away some border areas in the north that of the Arctic Ocean, our density is still about 6 times higher than the other side!"

"And I was surprised that the Russian railway system was divided into two types. The railway lines close to Austro-Hungary were controlled by the army, while domestic railway transportation was controlled by the transportation department, and the trains we were riding frequently advanced under the control of the two transportation systems."

"There are still a large number of narrow-gauge railways in the Russian railway system, and even Mara railways, which has a great impact on Russia's transportation capacity. I don't know the specific proportions. But what is certain is that in the vast inland areas, transportation efficiency will be very poor."

"But one thing to note is that the Russians' poor railway system will cause their mobilization to be slow. In fact, the Russians are already using various methods to make up for this problem. First, they have built a lot of material warehouses in the border areas. Secondly, the railway operation near Poland is relatively efficient, which means that they can quickly draw a large number of troops from the Baltic Sea coast and Moscow to enter the Polish area. The supplies needed can be completely solved by local warehouses."

"The real problem for the Russians is the lack of railway lines in their rear. I have asked Russian soldiers very much. The areas they are in are very scattered. If each soldier wants to come to Poland from their hometown or base, he will theoretically have to travel between 800 and 1,000 Russian miles! The first wave of Russian attacks will definitely be fierce, because this wave of attacks was prepared by the Russians for a long time. But then their supply speed will be very problematic. It is difficult for Ukrainian food and soldiers to reach the front line directly."

"With war breaking out, military transportation will inevitably squeeze out a large amount of civilian capacity, such as coal, grain, etc. The direct consequence of this is that there will be a large amount of food in Ukraine and a large amount of coal in the Sparton region, but these things cannot be delivered to the Baltic region to the north."

"I personally think that what is really fragile about the Russians' railway transportation is not in the Polish region, but inland transportation. The Russians have a lot of resources, but unfortunately, they cannot use these resources effectively. In peacetime, these goods can be transported to various regions, but in wartime, this is probably impossible, especially coal. The coal supply in the Sparton region accounts for more than 85% of Russia's total coal production, but this area requires a 1,000-kilometer railway to Moscow! So, we may not have to destroy the Russian army in the end, as a simple shortage of materials is enough!"

During the three years that this spy was in Russia, he collected a large amount of information through field visits, research and bribery. This information played an important role in Germany's future war against Russia. The final result of Russia's collapse was as expected by the spy. Russia was not without supplies, but was unable to achieve balanced allocation, which eventually led to the collapse of the economy and government!

Historically, Russia's transportation was indeed as hardened as arteriosclerosis during the war. Take the Spatton Coal Mine as an example. In 1913, the coal production of Spatton coal was 22 million tons, while the coal mines transported were about 17.09 million tons. During the war, although the output fluctuated, the lowest was even reduced to 18 million tons in 1917, but overall it was within an acceptable range.

However, the decline in foreign transportation volume was unacceptable. By 1917, the amount of coal transported by the Sparton Coal Mine was only 11.18 million tons! It was 6 million tons lower than before the war! The Sparton Coal Mine occupied 87.1% of Russia's coal mine production during the war. The gap in these 6 million tons of coal mines could not be compensated at all! Without coal, all industries would shrink significantly, and in the cold winter, if there were no coal, people's lives would fall into extreme dilemmas! It would be strange if the Russian government didn't have any trouble!

In fact, the coal mine gap was already very obvious in 1916. The coal shortage in various regions is as follows: St. Petersburg is 20%, Volga is 24%, Rostov is 29%, Ural is 43%, and Odessa is 50%!

Just imagine, in this case, what ability does Russia have to continue the war? Therefore, Russia's collapse is a historical necessity. Even if no one returns from Germany, Russia will still collapse. The heavy price paid in the war and the huge supply and demand pressure have put this country on the brink of destruction. The data collected by Grove in Russia in three years has further strengthened the prince's belief!
Chapter completed!